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1 Introduction 
 
The interaction between managerial delegation, trade unions and imperfectly competitive product 
markets gives rise to many issues, which are relevant to the concerns of management strategy, 
industrial relations and labor economics, as well as industrial organization. Indeed, the presence of 
labor unions can change human resources management procedures related to hiring, compensation 
and benefits based upon their research and management’s determination of business needs. A 
number of studies from different fields, ranging from human resource management to industrial 
relations, face those issues. In this paper, we adopt the approach of Industrial Organization (IO) to 
investigate a novel aspect of firms’ strategic decisions in the presence of unionization and imperfect 
product market competition, namely how unions affect the optimal choice by firms’ owners 
regarding the time for agreeing upon managerial contracts or, more specifically, if owners should 
strategically arrange those contracts before or after than unions set other (non-managerial) workers’ 
wages. 
 To deal with that topic we will refer to two classic strands in the IO literature, namely 
managerial delegation and unionized oligopolies.1 Relatively recent contributions combine those 
theoretic frameworks to investigate how the interplay between labor unions and the choice of 
managerial delegation contracts affects firms’ decisions and product market outcomes. Szymanski 
(1994) extends the standard managerial delegation model by introducing wage bargaining between 
managers and (firm-specific) unions, showing that owners set incentives closer to profit 
maximization than to sales maximization and that increasing union power may raise profitability of 
the firm. Bughin (1995), instead, considers a two-stage game in which, at the first stage, wages are 
bargained between firms and unions and, at the second stage, output decisions are made 
cooperatively by the owner (who maximizes profits) and the manager (who maximizes sales). In 
such a framework, it is highlighted that managerial incentive contracts weaken union power but, 
due to the presence of a prisoner’s dilemma situation, unions are not averse to those contracts. 
                                                
1 Just to mention the seminal contributions, managerial delegation literature started with the pioneering 
works by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). Horn and 
Wolinsky (1988), Davidson (1989) and Dowrick (1989), instead, originated the literature on unionized 
oligopolies. 
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Following Szymanski and Bughin’s seminal works, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2006), Liao 
(2010, 2014), Fanti and Meccheri (2013, 2015), Meccheri and Fanti (2014), Chatterjee and Saha 
(2016) and Fanti (2016) study managerial-unionized oligopoly models to explore various issues, 
such as strategic delegation in wage bargaining and optimal managerial delegation contracts under 
alternative unionization regimes. 
 However, all the above-mentioned contributions share a common feature: by considering 
multiple-stage delegation games with unions, they assume that the sequence of moves is 
exogenously given. Generally speaking, the standard hypothesis is that firms’ owners choose the 
managerial delegation contract at the first stage and wages for non-managerial workers are 
determined at the second stage, while at the final stage firms compete (i.e. managers choose 
strategic variables) in the product market. In some circumstances, such a sequence is a natural 
assumption. For instance, Szymanski (1994) considers that wages are bargained between managers 
and unions; in this case, “[a] natural (but not the only) interpretation of this set-up is that the 
manager bargains with the workforce collectively over the level of wages” (Szymanski 1994, p. 
108). However, this sequence is no longer obvious when wages are bargained by firms’ owners 
(Liao 2010, 2014) or, even less, under monopoly unions (Fanti and Meccheri 2013), that is, when 
unions directly fix wages. Hence, in the latter contexts, it makes sense to endogenize the stage at 
which firms’ owners decide the incentive contract of their managers. In other words, there is room 
to explore the endogenous mechanisms governing the sequence of (managerial and union) contracts 
in the strategic delegation game between owners. 
 We investigate a multiple-stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms 
compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to that, firm-specific unions set the workers’ 
wages, while the owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate the output decision to this 
manager. The firms’ owners also provide their managers with an incentive contract, that is, they 
choose a contract bonus weight to affect the manager’s choice of output (sales). However, while the 
previous literature generally assumes that owners choose the incentive contract for their managers 
before wages are set by unions, we admit that owners can freely decide the “timing” of their choice. 
More specifically, they can choose to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non-
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managerial) wage determination stage.2 Hence, we study the game between owners relative to the 
incentive contract stage in order to make this decision endogenous. This issue is highly relevant 
since final outcomes in product markets, particularly firms’ profitability, can be greatly affected by 
the sequence of the contracts that endogenously arises in strategic contexts. 
 Our main results can be summarized as follows. When firms’ owners adopt by assumption 
the same strategy (that is, they move together before or after unions’ wage setting) as intuitive, they 
prefer to play a leader position with respect to their respective unions, that is, to choose managerial 
contracts before unions’ wage setting. Instead, the results are much more elaborate and less intuitive 
when there is the possibility for owners to play asymmetric strategies. Indeed, in such a case, the 
opportunity for firms’ owners arises to delay the arrangement of managerial contracts relative to the 
union wage determination stage. More exactly, the possibility of multiple equilibria in the sequence 
of contracts applies when unions are neither extremely oriented towards employment, nor 
sufficiently oriented towards wages. This depends on the interplay between incentives for owners to 
use managerial contracts in order to affect, on the one hand, competition in final product markets 
and, on the other, wage determination by unions. Indeed, since owners can dampen the union’s 
wage claim by means of a negative bonus for the manager, when unions are distinctly oriented 
towards wages, it is better for owners choosing the managers’ contracts before wage setting to 
contrast the stronger union’s wage claim. Instead, when unions are employment-oriented, the 
(standard) “competition effect” on output played by the managerial bonus prevails. Owners prefer 
to provide incentives for sales, and profits are higher when the managerial contract is determined 
after wage setting, provided that the rival owner adopts the opposite strategy. Technically, in such a 
case, deviating from the (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium, in which both firms choose the managerial 
contract of their managers before unions’ wage setting, is profit-enhancing and also leads to a 
multiple equilibria situation. Moreover, for a given range of the unions’ preference parameter, the 
(less intuitive) equilibrium, in which owners “move” after their unions, is also risk-dominant and 
such results prove to be true also for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages 
vis-à-vis employment across unions. 
                                                
2 Consistently, the owners could decide to hire the manager (arranging at the same time the managerial 
contract) before or after unions’ wage setting. 
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To the best of our knowledge, the issue analyzed in this work is novel, since it has not been 
considered at all by the previous literature.3 However, it is worth recalling that, starting from the 
works by Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986) and Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), a huge literature, also 
referred to as endogenous timing literature, does exist which deals with a somewhat related topic. It 
considers the strategic choice of timing between duopolists, that is, whether firms prefer making 
quantity or price decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Lambertini (2000a, 2000b) and Fanti 
(2016) introduce in such a framework the role of managerial incentive contracts and managerial 
delegation together with unionized labor market, respectively, maintaining the focus of the analysis 
on the timing of decisions made by firms about quantities or prices in the product market. Instead, 
Bárcena-Ruiz (2013) and, in a quite different framework, Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1996) 
consider the timing of incentive managerial contracts. In particular, Bárcena-Ruiz (2013) shows 
under price competition that, in a private duopoly, if one firm is the leader in incentive contracts the 
other firm prefers to be the follower. Hence, in equilibrium, firms’ owners decide incentive 
contracts sequentially. By contrast, in a mixed duopoly, both the private and the public firm prefer 
to be the leader in incentive contracts. Thus, in equilibrium, firms make decisions simultaneously. 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1996), instead, study in a duopoly model with two stages of production 
whether firms’ owners prefer to choose short-term contracts (i.e. incentive parameters are chosen in 
each of the two periods) or a long-term contract (i.e. incentive parameters for both periods are 
chosen at the beginning of the first period) for their managers. They show that under Cournot 
competition owners choose long-term incentive contracts and thus incentive parameters for the two 
periods are chosen simultaneously. Instead, under Bertrand competition one owner chooses a long-
term contract and the other short-term contracts, meaning that owners choose managerial contracts 
simultaneously for the first period but sequentially for the second period. 
                                                
3 Kesavayuth and Zikos (2009) explore a partly related issue, that is, the endogenous determination of 
contracts in relation to the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. However, this work differs from 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2009) for various reasons. First, Kesavayuth and Zikos (2009) do not tackle 
managerial delegation. Moreover, while they aim at identifying under which conditions a particular contract 
type selection remains stable across firm-union pairs, this paper analyzes the decision by firms’ owners on 
the timing of delegation contracts with respect to union wage setting.      
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 Clearly, even if the timing of strategic decisions is also a key concern of this work, it differs 
with respect to the above-discussed (endogenous timing) literature: the relevant strategic choice for 
firms’ owners that is analyzed herein does not refer to one another moving simultaneously or 
sequentially but, instead, to choosing the incentive contracts of their managers before or after 
unions’ wage setting, which is a completely different issue. Moreover, while Bárcena-Ruiz (2013) 
and Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1996) do not consider labor unions in determining wages, this is a 
key feature of our model, which plays a central role for our final outcomes.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic 
framework and briefly recall the results already derived in Fanti and Meccheri (2013) for the cases 
in which owners adopt symmetric strategies. We then study the case in which owners adopt 
asymmetric strategies. In Section 3, we endogenously derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium of 
the game between owners, showing that multiple equilibria can arise. Section 4 extends the model 
by introducing heterogeneity in unions’ preferences into the analysis. Section 5 concludes, while 
more technical proofs are provided in the final Appendix. 
 
 
2 Model 
 
2.1 Basic framework and sequence of the events 
 
This paper builds on Fanti and Meccheri (2013) where, motivated by their prominent institutional 
role in labor markets, we introduce the presence of unions in determining workers’ wages in a 
managerial delegation basic framework (e.g. van Witteloostuijn et al. 2007; Jansen et al. 2009). In 
particular, we consider a normalized duopolistic Cournot market for a single homogeneous product, 
with inverse demand given by: 
 
€ 
p(Q) =1−Q            [1] 
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where p denotes price and Q is the sum of the firms’ output levels, Q = qi + qj, for i, j = 1, 2 and i ≠ 
j.4 
Both firms produce according to a standard production function with constant returns to 
labor ii Lq = , where iL  represents the level of employment of firm i. Firm i faces a marginal (and 
average) cost 0 £ wi < 1 for any unit of output produced, where iw  is the per-worker wage. 
Therefore, firm i ’s cost function is linear and described by: 
 
€ 
Ci(qi) = wi Li = wi qi .          [2] 
 
We assume that wage contracts are monopolistically chosen by firm-specific unions, which 
have preferences weighted on wage and employment: 
 
€ 
Vi = wiθLi1−θ = wiθqi1−θ           [3] 
 
where q Î (0,1) is the relative weight placed by unions on wages with respect to employment. In 
particular, q > (<) 0.5 means that unions have relatively more wage-oriented (employment-oriented) 
preferences, while q = 0.5 refers to the special case of total wage-bill maximization.5 
                                                
4 Note that the standard inverse demand p' = a – bQ' can be obtained from this normalized model simply by 
fixing p = p'/a and Q = (b/a)Q'. 
5 In this section referred to the basic framework, we consider that the parameter q is uniform across unions. 
This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4 where we will analyze the role played by heterogeneity of 
unions’ preferences. Consider also that, with some caveats, θ could be interpreted as the relative bargaining 
power of the union in a Nash bargaining model where wages, instead of being monopolistically set by the 
union, are negotiated between the union and the firm. Indeed, denoting the relative bargaining power of the 
union by  b, it is easy to show that the bargained wage (w∗) increases monotonically in both θ and b, and that 
limθ→0 w∗ = limb→0 w∗ = 0. As pointed out by Lommerud and Straume (2012, fn. 13) “This is not surprising, 
as the two parameters will enter the Nash maximand in a mathematically similar way – and we might, in 
some applications, even choose the alternative interpretation of θ as reflecting the relative bargaining power 
of the trade union”. 
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Moreover, the owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate the output decision to this 
manager by means of a managerial contract. Such contract provides for a fixed salary to the 
manager plus a bonus element, which is related to a weighted combination between firms’ profits 
and sales: if firm i’s profits 
€ 
π i are positive – otherwise there is no bonus – manager i receives a 
bonus that is proportional to 
€ 
ui = π i + biqi, where the weight bi is chosen by owner i to maximize 
profits and can be either positive or negative according to whether the owner provides incentives or 
disincentives to the manager’s choice of output (sales).6 
 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of events (possible sub-games) 
 
We aim at investigating as the sequence of contracts (i.e. the managerial contract chosen by 
the firm’s owner and the wage contract set by the union) endogenously arises. We consider that 
each firm’s owner can decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after her/his union wage 
                                                
6 We also follow the standard assumption made by managerial delegation theory that the fixed component 
(salary) of the manager's pay is chosen by the firm’s owner such that the manager exactly receives his/her 
opportunity cost, which is normalized to zero. 
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setting. Accordingly, before the game begins (at a sort of pre-play stage), we admit that each owner 
i can refer to three different possible sequence of events (or subgames) that will apply during the 
game, which are summarized in Figure 1. In particular, while we assume that, as usual (and 
natural), market competition always occurs at the final stage of the game (t = 3), with managers 
simultaneously choosing output, relative to the previous stages (t = 1 and t = 2) three different 
scenarios are possible. In a first scenario (labeled as First-First or FF Case in Figure 1), both 
owners decide to arrange (simultaneously) managerial contracts at time t = 1, that is, before their 
respective unions (simultaneously) set workers’ wages (which occurs at t = 2). In a second scenario 
(labeled as Second-Second or SS Case in Figure 1), both owners decide to arrange managerial 
contracts at time t = 2, hence after union wage setting (which occurs previously at t = 1). Finally, 
there is the possibility that an owner hires the manager and chooses the managerial contract at t = 1 
before her/his firm-specific union sets wages (at t = 2), while the other owner chooses the opposite, 
which is the case labeled as Asymmetric Case in Figure 1. 
Since the possible above-described sequences represent the core of this work, it is 
worthwhile providing and discussing a rationale behind them. Indeed, this can be done along 
different possible lines. First, in many multi-stage game theoretic models, the sequence of the 
moves is provided relative to the different degree of irreversibility or commitment of the decisions 
that should be made at different stages. The latter stages correspond to those decisions that are 
relatively easy to modify even in the short run, such as output or prices, while former stages relate 
to those that are “sunk” or that can be adjusted only in a longer time horizon, such as production 
capacity (Spence 1977; Dixit 1980) or R&D investments (Brander and Spencer 1983). In this 
perspective, the possibility for firms’ owners to choose managerial contracts before or after unions’ 
wage setting may be linked to the different length of contracts. Specifically, we consider that 
owners are free to decide the length of managerial contracts relative to that of union contracts for 
non-managerial workers. Indeed, in many countries, collective agreements on employment 
involving trade unions are highly regulated by institutional norms and rules, which typically refer 
also to the duration of the agreement (i.e. the contract length). On the other hand, individual 
employment contracts, such as those for managers, are generally more flexible in any aspect, 
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including duration, which can be defined by the parties.7 Accordingly, we can interpret our 
framework as follows: (institutionally) given the length of collective agreements, firms’ owners can 
decide a duration for managerial contracts which is either shorter (which corresponds to a situation 
in which managerial contracts are chosen after wage contracts) or longer (which corresponds to a 
situation where managerial contracts are chosen before wage contracts) than that of union 
contracts.8 
Another possible interpretation hinges on the role of “agenda setters” that characterizes 
firms’ owners in this framework, since they are centrally implicated in all relationships, with both 
managers and unions. Indeed, even if our theoretical model concentrates on a situation in which 
managerial contracts are chosen by firms’ owners and workers’ wages are set by unions, these can 
be considered special cases of bargaining between owners and managers over managerial contracts 
(with owners having all the bargaining power), and between owners and unions over wages (with 
unions having all the bargaining power), respectively. Consider, for instance, a situation in which 
there are two dates (which correspond to t = 1 and t = 2 of Figure 1), at which managerial contracts 
and wages should be decided (bargained). Since the owner is involved in both meetings (at least, 
s/he has to sign both contracts!), it makes sense to suppose that s/he retains the possibility to 
schedule the agenda, that is, to choose whether to meet the manager at time t = 1 and the union at 
time t = 2, or vice versa.9 
                                                
7 We defer to Malcomson (1999) for a broader discussion on this point and for further details about 
individual employment contracts. 
8 Note that such an interpretation also appears consistent with the idea of short-term and long-term 
managerial incentive contracts considered and analyzed, in a different framework (i.e. a dynamic two-period 
model where contracts can be either one or two periods long) and without unions, by Bárcena-Ruiz and 
Espinosa (1996). Indeed, as they affirm, “a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a 
short-term contract makes it a follower” (Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa 1996, p. 343). 
9 This can also provide a reason for ruling out a possibility that is not contemplated in our framework, 
namely managerial and wage contracts are offered simultaneously. Indeed, since we consider that the 
managerial contract is offered (chosen) by the firm’s owner, while the wage contract is offered (set) by the 
union, excluding the possibility that managerial and wage contracts are determined simultaneously is quite 
reasonable. As pointed out by a referee, in a different context, such as the one where both contracts are 
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According to the framework above discussed, and by adopting the usual backward induction 
logic, at the final stage (the market game), each manager sets the level of output for her/his firm to 
maximize 
€ 
ui = π i + biqi = (1− wi −Q+ bi)qi , leading to the following reaction function in output 
space: 
 
€ 
qi(q j ) =
1− wi − q j + bi
2 .         [4] 
 
From equation [4], by substituting for the corresponding of firm j, we get the equilibrium 
output, for given wi, wj, bi and bj (i.e. at the final stage): 
 
€ 
qi(bi,b j ,wi,w j ) =
1+ 2bi − b j − 2wi + w j
3 .       [5] 
 
 However, before firms (managers) engage in competition, workers’ wages should be set by 
unions and managerial contracts be defined by firms’ owners. Since, we are interested in 
endogenously deriving the owners’ choice of whether to define their managers’ contracts before or 
after unions’ wage setting, we first have to calculate and compare the (equilibrium) profits for 
firms’ owners in relation to any pair of possible strategies, as represented in Figure 1: both owner i 
and owner j choose their managerial contracts before unions’ wage setting (First-First case); both 
owner i and owner j choose their managerial contracts after unions’ wage setting (Second-Second 
case); owner i (j) chooses before wage setting while owner j (i) after wage setting (Asymmetric 
strategies case). 
 
2.2 Symmetric strategies: First-First and Second-Second cases 
 
In this section we present the results relative to situations in which both firms’ owners adopt a 
symmetric strategy: i) both choose to define the managerial contract before unions fix wages, and ii) 
                                                                                                                                                            
offered by the firm’s owner(s), also the case in which contracts are offered simultaneously should be 
considered to endogenize the sequence of contracts.    
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both choose the contract after wage setting. In some sense, the former option corresponds to a 
situation in which firms’ owners decide to play a “leader” (first-mover) position with regard to their 
respective unions, while in the latter case they opt for a “follower” (second-mover) position. Since 
such situations have already been studied in Fanti and Meccheri (2013), we single out here only the 
results which are relevant to the analysis below, deferring to our previous work for greater detail. 
In particular, identifying with the superscript FF the case in which both owners move before 
unions (First-First case), standard backward analysis leads, for each firm i and j, to the following 
(sub-game perfect) equilibrium bonus weight, output, wage and profit, respectively (Fanti and 
Meccheri, 2013, Section 3.1): 
 
€ 
bFF = − 7θ
2 − 20θ + 4
2 2θ 2 −θ −10( )
;   
€ 
qFF = (1−θ)(4 −θ)(5 − 2θ)(2 + θ) ; 
€ 
wFF = 3θ(4 −θ)2(5 − 2θ)(2 + θ) ;   
€ 
π FF =
(1−θ)(4 −θ)(4 +10θ − 5θ 2)
2(5 − 2θ)2(2 + θ)2 .    [6] 
 
 Also important to our following analyses and results is the fact that, unless unions are 
distinctly oriented towards employment (i.e. unless θ < 0.2164), it is optimal for owners to 
“penalize” sales, that is, to choose a managerial contract providing for a negative bonus weight 
(Fanti and Meccheri, 2013, Lemma 1). This result contrasts with the received literature on 
managerial delegation (without unions), according to which, when firms compete in quantities, 
owners provide incentive for sales (b > 0) in order to drive their managers to be more aggressive in 
the market and force the rival to reduce output (e.g. Fershtman and Judd 1987). This result can be 
explained by the fact that, in the presence of unions, when firms’ owners choose managerial 
contracts before wage setting, they can dampen the unions’ wage claims by driving their managers 
to reduce output, hence employment. This “wage effect” outweighs the standard “competition 
effect” highlighted by the received literature, resulting in a negative equilibrium bonus weight.10 
                                                
10 This holds true unless unions are extremely employment-oriented. Obviously, in that case, the wage effect 
becomes negligible (unions “naturally” opt for a low workers’ pay to increase employment, hence there is no 
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Instead, identifying with the superscript SS the case in which both owners move after unions 
(Second-Second case), we get that, for each firm i and j, the following bonus weight, output, wage 
and profit, respectively, apply in (sub-game perfect) equilibrium (Fanti and Meccheri, 2013, Section 
5): 
 
€ 
bSS = 3(1−θ)5(3− 2θ) ;   
€ 
qSS = 6(1−θ)5(3− 2θ) ; 
€ 
wSS = θ3− 2θ ;   
€ 
π SS =
18(1−θ)2
25(3− 2θ)2 .        [7] 
 
 Relative to the bonus weight, the standard outcome that managers are always rewarded for 
sales now always applies. This makes sense. When unions move before owners, from the latter’s 
viewpoint, the situation is exactly the same as in the standard managerial delegation game without 
unions, in which firms face exogenously given production costs. In other words, there is no gain for 
owners to choose a negative bonus weight to reduce wages simply because wages have already 
been fixed by unions. Hence, only the standard competitive effect applies and, in equilibrium, the 
bonus weight on sales is positive, implying that managers behave more aggressively in the product 
market. To conclude this section, we establish the following lemma relative to the comparison of 
owners’ profits when they adopt symmetric strategies: 
 
Lemma 1. When firms’ owners adopt symmetric strategies, they always prefer to choose their 
managers’ contracts before unions set wages. 
 
Proof. See the final Appendix. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
room for reducing wages further by relying on bonus weight) and the competition effect prevails, leading to 
a (standard) positive equilibrium bonus weight. 
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 While a formal proof is provided in the Appendix, Figure 2 below presents a graphical 
analysis of Lemma 1.11 
 
 
Figure 2. Symmetric strategies profit differential according to q 
 
Intuitively, each owner (when the rival behaves in the same way) prefers to play a leader 
position with respect to the union that sets wages for her/his workers, since this permits the owner 
to obtain higher profits. Put in other words, from the firms’ owners’ viewpoint, the First-First pair 
of strategies, in which both owners choose the delegation contract of their managers before wage 
setting, always Pareto-dominates the Second-Second pair of strategies. This is because, by fixing a 
negative bonus weight in managerial contracts, owners encourage managers to reduce output 
(hence, employment) at the final stage, for any given wage level. In turn, this induces unions to put 
a brake on their wage claims to preserve an adequate level of employment. 
Moreover, the greatest advantage for owners to choose managerial contracts before unions’ 
wage setting realizes when unions are not excessively oriented either towards wages or towards 
employment (i.e. for intermediate values of q), hence they are willing to trade wage off for 
employment. Instead, when unions are only oriented towards employment (q ® 0) or towards 
                                                
11 All graphical analyses are derived in MAPLE. More details and programs are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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wages (q ® 1), there is no advantage for firms’ owners to assume a leader position with respect to 
their own unions, i.e. the profit differential pFF – pSS, represented in Figure 2, collapses to zero. 
Indeed, from [6] and [7], we can note that when q ® 0 wages do not depend on the bonus weights 
chosen by owners for their managers, eliminating the advantage for owners to “move” before union 
wage setting. Instead, when q ® 1 profits tend to zero in both (FF and SS) cases,12 hence also the 
differential pFF – pSS will tend to zero. 
 
2.3 Asymmetric strategies 
 
To assess whether the (Pareto-dominant) First-First pair of strategies actually arises as equilibrium 
of the game between owners, we have to ascertain whether (or not) an owner gains by deviating 
from that strategy, hence evaluating the owners’ profits when they play asymmetric strategies.13 For 
instance, without loss of generality, let us suppose that owner i hires the manager and chooses the 
managerial contract before her/his firm-specific union sets wages, while owner j plays the opposite 
strategy. Hence, just before managers compete in the product market, the union of firm i has to fix 
the wage of its workers, taking bi and wj (that have already been determined) as well as bj as given. 
On the other side, owner j has to choose the managerial contract, taking bi and wj (that have already 
been determined) as well as wi as given. 
 Substituting [5] in [3] and maximizing with respect to wi, we get the sub-game 
perfect best-reply function in wages of union i: 
 
€ 
wi(bi,b j ,w j ) =
θ(1+ 2bi − b j + w j )
2 .        [8] 
 
                                                
12 This is due to the presence of the well-known “Chesire cat paradox”.  
13 Since such a situation has not been considered before in the literature, we present and discuss the 
derivation of the equilibrium results for this case in greater detail. 
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Instead, at the same stage, owner j maximizes profits, πj = (p – wj)qj, with respect to bj, 
taking into account the corresponding (symmetric) equation of [5] for qj, which leads to the 
following best-reply function for bj: 
 
€ 
bj (bi,wi,w j ) =
1− bi + wi − 2w j
4 .        [9] 
 
 By substituting [9] in [8] and solving with respect to wi, we get: 
 
€ 
wi(bi,w j ) =
3θ(1+ 3bi + 2w j )
8 + θ ,        [10] 
 
while, by substituting back in [9] for [10], and solving with respect to bj, we obtain: 
 
€ 
bj (bi,w j ) =
2(1− bi − 2w j ) + θ(1+ 2bi + w j )
8 + θ .       [11] 
 
At the initial stage, by taking [10] and [11] into account, owner i maximizes pi with respect 
to bi, while union j maximizes Vj with respect to wj, which leads to, respectively: 
 
€ 
bi(w j ) =
(4 −13θ)(1+ 2w j )
6(2 + 7θ) ,         [12] 
€ 
w j (bi) =
θ 2 + θ − 2bi(1−θ)[ ]
4 −θ .        [13] 
 
 Finally, by solving the system represented by [12] and [13], and then by substituting back, 
we get the following (sub-game perfect) equilibrium values for firm i (the superscript FS identifies 
the equilibrium values for the firm that moves before the union when the competitor behaves in the 
opposite way): 
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€ 
bFS =
(4 −13θ) 4 + 3θ + 2θ 2( )
2A ;   
€ 
qFS =
3 4 −θ −θ 2 − 2θ 3( )
A ; 
€ 
wFS =
9θ 4 + 3θ + 2θ 2( )
2A ;   
€ 
π FS =
3 4 −θ −θ 2 − 2θ 3( ) 8 + 34θ + 25θ 2 +14θ 3( )
2A2 ,  [14]
  
where 
€ 
A ≡ 24 + 86θ − 55θ 2 + 26θ 3 . Instead, the following equilibrium values apply for firm j (the 
superscript SF identifies the equilibrium values for the firm that moves after the union when the 
competitor behaves in the opposite way): 
 
€ 
bSF = 4 + 27θ − 39θ
2 + 8θ 3
A ;   
€ 
qSF =
2 4 + 27θ − 39θ 2 + 8θ 3( )
A ; 
€ 
wSF =
θ 8 + 65θ + 8θ 2( )
A ;   
€ 
π SF =
2 4 + 27θ − 39θ 2 + 8θ 3( )
2
A2 .     [15] 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that owner i decides his/her manager’s contract before union’s wage 
setting, while owner j after union’s wage setting. The following outcomes apply: 
• the bonus weight set by owner i is negative unless unions are distinctly oriented towards 
employment (q < 0.3077). Instead, the bonus weight set by owner j is positive unless unions 
are distinctly oriented towards wages (q > 0.8355); 
• this also leads to the following equilibrium output, wage and profit differentials between 
firms i and j: 
- qi < qj, unless q < 0.078; 
- wi < wj, unless q < 0.1949; 
- pi < pj, if 0.0591 < q < 0.513; pi > pj, otherwise. 
 
Proof. See the final Appendix. 
  
 Proposition 1 points out that the results obtained and discussed in Section 2.2 are generally 
confirmed even when owners choose managerial contracts at different stages: a first-mover owner 
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(with respect to the union but, in this asymmetric case, relative also to the rival owner) penalizes 
her/his manager on sales, while a second-mover provides her/his manager with incentives on sales. 
This applies, for instance, for the benchmark case of total wage bill maximizing unions (that is, 
when q = ½). Indeed, only when q is very high, that is, when unions are strongly wage-oriented, an 
owner (say owner j) who moves second also decides to penalize the manager on sales, which could 
seem quite counterintuitively. Specifically, since union j has already set the wage when owner j 
decides the managerial contract (hence, there is no possibility of dampening her/his own union’s 
wage claims by hinging on the bonus weight of the manager), why should the latter choose a 
negative bonus? 
The logic can be understood by considering that the negative bonus weight chosen (at the 
previous stage) by owner i pushes, together with the high wage set (at the same stage) by the 
(strongly wage-oriented) union i, towards an increase in firm j’s output. Thus, in order to moderate 
this output increase (which can also lead to an excessive market price reduction), owner j has to 
penalize her/his manager on sales (output). In general, since owner i (j) typically opts for a 
negative (positive) bonus, both output and wage are (generally) higher for firm j than for firm i. In 
turn, since the market price is the same for both firms, this leads to a trade-off between revenues 
and production costs (wages). 
Relative to profits, intuitively, when unions are distinctly wage-oriented, moving first is 
better to counter, by means of a negative bonus weight, the stronger wage claim made by the union. 
Instead, when unions are more (but not solely) employment-oriented, the effect on output prevails 
over that on wages, leading to a situation in which profits are higher for the firm that moves second. 
This is graphically shown in Figure 3. However, also note that profits are higher for owner i (who 
moves first) when unions are only interested in employment, that is, when q ® 0. This makes sense. 
Indeed, in such a case, unions set wages at the workers’ reservation level (which is zero in this 
model), corresponding to the situation in which marginal costs are exogenously given. Hence, this 
limiting case collapses de facto to the endogenous timing framework on whether firms’ owners 
prefer to decide managerial contracts sequentially or simultaneously (Bárcena-Ruiz 2013) and, as 
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expected, since competition is in output (strategic substitutes), both firms prefer to move before 
their rival, that is, to be the leader rather than to be the follower.14 
 
 
Figure 3. Asymmetric strategies profit differential according to q 
 
 
3 Equilibrium sequence of contracts 
 
In this section, we derive the equilibrium choice made by the firms’ owners about the sequence of 
contracts, that is, whether to choose the delegation contracts for managers before or after their 
respective unions set wage contracts. The following table represents the strategic form of such a 
“moves game” between owners. Specifically, F represents the strategy of moving first (i.e. choosing 
the delegation contract before wage setting), while S that of moving second (i.e. choosing the 
delegation contract after wage setting). 
 
 
 
                                                
14 By contrast, when competition is in prices (strategic complements), the opposite applies (see Bárcena-Ruiz 
2013, Section 3.2). 
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owner i \ owner j F S 
F pFF, pFF pFS, pSF 
S pSF, pFS pSS, pSS 
 
Table 1: The owners’ “moves game”: strategic form 
 
 While Lemma 1 has already dealt with the comparison between pFF and pSS, the following 
lemma deals with the comparisons of the pairs of profits, which are relevant to finding the 
equilibrium of the game in Table 1. As usual, this relates to the opportunity for a given firm to 
deviate from symmetric strategies (that is, pFF vs. pSF and pSS vs. pFS). 
 
Lemma 2. From simple comparisons of equilibrium profits under different strategies by firms’ 
owners, the following results apply: 
 
- pFF > pSF, for any q Î (0, 1); 
- pSS > pFS  if  0.018 < q < 0.47; pSS < pFS otherwise. 
 
Proof. See the final Appendix. 
 
 Figure 4 below provides a graphical proof of Lemma 2. 
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Figure 4. Incentives to deviate from symmetric strategies: profit differentials according to q : 
a) pFF vs. pSF and b) pSS vs. pFS 
 
 The outcomes that arise from Lemma 2 are quite intuitive given what has already been 
discussed in Section 2 (especially relative to Proposition 1). Ideally, with respect to a pair of 
strategies providing that both owners move before their unions, there is no gain for an owner to 
deviate, since profits would be lower: when the competitor is also a leader, a firm’s owner always 
prefers to be a leader than to be a follower of her/his own union. Instead, if both owners are 
followers of their unions, that is, they choose managerial contracts after unions’ contracts, it is 
advantageous for an owner to deviate from this pair of strategies but only if the unions place a 
sufficiently large importance to wages, attaching to the latter at least the same weight than to 
employment.15 As discussed above, this result can be explained by the fact that, when unions are 
sufficiently wage-oriented (total wage-bill maximizing, at least), it is better to move first in order to 
dampen the union’s wage claim. Instead, when unions are particularly (but not extremely) 
employment-oriented, on the one hand, the benefit of moderating the union’s wage claim through a 
negative bonus is less sizable and, on the other, the standard “competition effect” becomes more 
important, especially because the rival owner, who moves at the later stage, will drive the manager 
                                                
15 To be rigorous, as stated by Lemma 2 and shown in Figure 4b (right-hand side), this also applies in the less 
notable (and less interesting) case, in which unions are only interested in employment (i.e. q < 0.018).   
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to be more aggressive on the product market through incentives on sales. This implies that, in such 
a situation, it will be more advantageous to counter the competitor at the same (later) stage by 
choosing a higher positive bonus weight for the manager. 
According to Lemma 2, and also taking Lemma 1 into account, the following proposition 
can now be established. 
 
Proposition 2. When unions are neither extremely oriented towards employment, nor sufficiently 
oriented towards wages (that is, when 0.018 < q < 0.47), the “moves game” between owners has 
two (Subgame Perfect) Nash equilibria, in which owners play symmetric strategies, i.e. First-First 
(FF) and Second-Second (SS). Such equilibria are Pareto-ranked: the equilibrium FF, in which 
both owners move before their respective unions, Pareto-dominates the equilibrium SS, in which 
both owners move after their respective unions. When, instead, unions are either extremely 
employment-oriented or, most importantly, sufficiently wage-oriented (total wage-bill maximizing, 
at least), the (Pareto-dominant) equilibrium FF only applies in the “moves game” between owners. 
 
 Proposition 2 reveals the possibility of multiple equilibria when 0.018 < q < 0.47 and calls 
for further investigation for this case. Considering for the sake of simplicity and for reasons of 
stability only the pure-strategy equilibrium selection,16 we can refer to two most well known 
selection criteria: Pareto dominance and risk dominance. Indeed, one might argue that the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium FF is the focal point and owners would coordinate on such an equilibrium. 
However, as broadly supported by experimental results (e.g. van Huyck et al. 1990), agents 
frequently fail to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In particular, coordination failure 
arises because of strategic uncertainty: if one player is uncertain that the other player will choose 
the efficient strategy, s/he might choose the safer option. Hence, when players are interested to 
minimize the risk of coordination failure, they will tend to coordinate on the risk-dominant strategy, 
even if it is Pareto-inferior with respect to another strategy. 
                                                
16 Since the game between owners when 0.018 < q < 0.47 is a typical coordination game, in addition to the 
two pure-strategy equilibria there also exists one mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
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 Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) notion of risk dominance is known to capture this idea in two-
agent games. Accordingly, a strategy pair risk-dominates another strategy pair if the product of the 
deviation losses is higher for the former. In this case of a symmetric game, if we assume that each 
owner assigns probabilities ½ to each rival’s strategy,17 then the strategic situation FF (strictly) risk-
dominates SS if the expected payoff from playing F exceeds the expected payoff from playing S, 
that is, if (pFF + pFS)/2 > (pSS + pSF)/2, or simply (pFF + pFS) > (pSS + pSF). Obviously, when instead 
the opposite applies, SS risk-dominates FF. 
 
Proposition 3. There exists a range for q, which is given by 0.0973 < q < 0.2956, according to 
which the strategic situation SS risk-dominates FF. Otherwise, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium FF 
is also risk-dominant with respect to SS. 
 
 
4 An extension: heterogeneous preferences across unions 
 
In this section, we extend the above analysis by admitting that preferences over wages and 
employment may differ across unions. Accordingly, unions’ utility functions are now given by:18 
 
Vi = wiθiqi1−θi            [16] 
 
and standard analysis leads to the following equilibrium profits for any different case (FF case, SS 
case and Asymmetric case):19 
                                                
17 The assignment of such probabilities can be considered an example of Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient 
Reason. 
18 By comparing [16] against [3], notice that the index i now also applies to the parameter q. 
19 For sake of space, analytical passages (which, however, parallel those above analyzed for the basic 
framework with homogeneous preferences across unions) are not reported here and are available from the 
authors upon request. In the final Appendix, sub-game perfect equilibrium values for wages, bonuses and 
output are reported for the different cases of this section.  
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π i
FF = −
(4−θ j )(4θiθ j −θi −10θ j − 2)(1−θi )
θi
2 (20θ j2 −37θ j +8)− 2θi (29θ j2 − 28θ j −10)
+ 4(5θ j2 +11θ j + 2)
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
2 8(θiθ j )2 −13θi2θ j −13θiθ j2 − 4θi2 − 25θiθ j − 4θ j2 + 56(θi +θ j )+ 20⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 ; 
π i
SS =
18(1−θi )2 (2θ j +3)2
25(9− 4θiθ j )2
; 
π i
FS =
3(2θiθ j −θi + 4θ j + 4)2(1−θi )(7θi + 2)
2A12
;   π j
SF =
2(4−θi )2 (1−θ j )2 (8θi +1)2
A12   [17] 
 
where 24878342126 221 +++--º jijiijiA qqqqqqq   and, as above, the superscript FF (resp. SS) 
indicates the profit of firm i when both managerial contracts are chosen before (resp. after) wage 
setting,20 while FS and SF refer to the profits of firm i and j, respectively, when the former chooses 
managerial contract before union wage setting and the latter adopts the opposite strategy.    
 Sub-game perfect equilibrium profits, reported in [17], can be used to endogenize the 
owners’ choice about the timing of managerial contracts vis-à-vis union wage setting. The following 
table represents the strategic form of the game between owners when their unions (may) have 
asymmetric preferences over wages and employment: 
 
owner i \ owner j F S 
F piFF, pjFF piFS, pjSF 
S piSF, pjFS piSS, pjSS 
 
Table 2: The owners’ “moves game” with asymmetric unions: strategic form 
 
                                                
20 Notice that, since i, j = 1, 2 with i ¹ j, firms’ profits are now different even if they choose managerial 
contracts simultaneously. 
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Similarly to what above done in the basic framework with homogeneous unions’ 
preferences, we have to check the sign of the following key profit differentials in order to identify 
the firms’ owners choice, hence the sequence of contracts that endogenously arises: piFF vs. piSF; 
piFS vs. piSS; pjFF vs. pjSF and pjFS vs. pjSS. While we get that piFF > piSF and pjFF > pjSF for any qi, qj 
Î (0,1), the sign of the other key profit differentials depends on parameters qi and qj. The following 
figures show all the combinations of unions’ preference parameters, for which piSS > piFS (resp. pjSS 
> piFS) applies – in grey area X (resp. Y) –, or instead piSS < piFS (resp. pjSS < pjFS) holds true – in 
white area. 
           
        
Figure 5. Incentives to deviate from symmetric strategies: a) piSS vs. piFS; and b) pjSS vs. pjFS   
 
Hence, according to the results highlighted by the above figures, we can deduce that in the 
region where grey areas of Figure 5a and 5b overlap, that is for all qi, qj Î (0,1) for which áX Ç Yñ 
applies, we get two symmetric sub-game perfect equilibria with owners choosing simultaneously 
managerial contracts before or after union wage setting. Instead, for all other combinations of qi and 
qj only one FF equilibrium does exist, in which managerial contracts are chosen before union wage 
setting. 
This result is represented by Figure 6, where the white area is characterized by the presence 
of only one FF equilibrium while the dark area, obtained as intersection between areas X and Y of 
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Figure 4, represents the region of multiple equilibria. Moreover, relative to the latter, in the darker 
blue area the FF equilibrium risk-dominates the SS equilibrium; instead, in the grey area located 
inside the multiple equilibria region, the SS equilibrium is risk-dominant21 (also notice that in 
Figure 5 the 45-degree line permits to recall the homogeneous unions’ preferences case of Section 
3, confirming the results discussed therein). 
 
 
Figure 6. Endogenous equilibria with asymmetric unions 
Note: white area: FF equilibrium; blue area: FF and SS equilibria (FF risk-
dominant); grey area: FF and SS equilibria (SS risk-dominant) 
 
Basically, the above-described results point out how introducing asymmetry in unions’ 
preferences enable us to generalize the main results obtained in Section 3, which does not change 
qualitatively. At the same time, the analysis performed in this section permits to provide some 
interesting qualifications of the previous analysis. In particular, when unions are not particularly 
wage-oriented, multiple (symmetric) equilibria can be obtained for a remarkable degree of 
asymmetry in unions’ preferences. For instance, from Figure 6, we can infer that when union i is 
                                                
21 Since the game between owners is now asymmetric, due to the presence of heterogeneous preferences 
across unions, to analyze strategy risk-dominance we have to refer to the following inequality concerning 
products of deviation losses: (piFS – piSS)(pjFS – pjSS) ³ (piSF – piFF)(pjSF – pjFF). 
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total wage-bill maximizing, that is, qi = ½, multiple equilibria apply for any value of qj from 0 up to 
around 0.4. 
Finally, a finding of this section deserves to be recalled since it represents an interesting 
novelty with respect to the case analyzed in Section 3. Indeed, while with homogeneous unions’ 
preferences an equilibrium can arise where both owners choose managerial contracts after union 
wage setting but, in that case, they both are worse off relative to the FF case (that is, when the SS 
equilibrium actually arises a prisoner’s dilemma situation applies), introducing asymmetry in 
preferences can give rise to a situation in which, in the presence of multiple equilibria, an owner 
(but not both) is better off under SS than under FF equilibrium. This scenario is graphically 
represented in Figure 7, where the areas in blue (dark), which belong to the region where multiple 
equilibria apply, are those in which an owner (owner i in area H or owner j in area K, respectively) 
is better off when both managerial contracts are chosen after union wage setting.22               
 
 
Figure 7. Areas H and K where an owner is better off under SS equilibrium  
 
 
    
 
                                                
22 Notice, however, that in those areas the SS equilibrium is not risk-dominant. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigated a multiple-stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) 
firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to that, firm-specific unions set the 
workers’ wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive 
contracts in order to affect their output decisions in the product market. While the literature in 
question generally assumes that owners choose the incentive contract for their managers before 
wages are set by unions, we supposed that owners can freely decide the “timing” of their move, i.e. 
they can arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non-managerial) stage at which wage 
contract are determined. This can be rationalized by the fact that, while union contract length is 
institutionally defined, owners are free to decide the length of managerial contracts; alternatively, 
since owners are centrally implicated in all relationships with both their managers and unions, they 
play the role of “agenda setter” in this framework. Hence we analyzed the (endogenous) choice of 
the incentive contract stage, which is highly relevant to the concerns of industrial organization and 
corporate governance. 
Due to the presence of strategic interaction at multi-stage levels (i.e. in product market 
competition, in unions’ wage setting and in determining managerial incentive contracts), our 
findings show that, quite counter-intuitively, firms’ owners may prefer not to play a leader position 
with respect to their own unions. To be more precise, there arises the possibility of multiple (sub-
game perfect) equilibria, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions’ 
wage setting (or contracts), when unions are neither extremely employment-oriented, nor 
sufficiently wage-oriented, hence crucially depending on unions’ preferences. Moreover, for a given 
range of the unions’ preference parameter, the (less intuitive) equilibrium, in which owners “move” 
after their unions, is also risk-dominant. Finally, admitting that unions have heterogeneous 
preferences over wages and employment permits to generalize the above findings, as well as to 
show that they hold true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in unions’ preferences. 
Future research to extend our results could be carried out along various lines. The 
framework could be extended to deal with other managerial incentive structures, such as “relative 
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performance delegation”. Furthermore, assessing the robustness of our results by introducing, for 
instance, price competition and/or product differentiation into the analysis deserves to be explored. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A1 Proof of Lemma 1 
 
By comparing πFF from [6] against πSS from [7], we get: 
 
€ 
π FF −π SS =
(1−θ) 6180 −13826θ +12465θ 2 − 4788θ 3 + 644θ 4( )
50(5 − 2θ)2(2 + θ)2(3− 2θ)2 > 0,  ∀θ ∈ (0,1).  ■ 
 
 
A2 Proof of Proposition 1 
 
By taking bFS from [14] and bSF from [15], we get: 
 
€ 
bFS >
<
0⇔ 4 −13θ >
<
 0⇔θ <
>
4
13 = 0.3077 ; 
€ 
bSF >
<
0⇔ 4 + 27 − 39θ + 8θ 2 >
<
 0⇔θ <
>
39
16 −
3
16 73 = 0.8355 . 
 
 Moreover, from [14] and [15], by comparing outputs, wages and profits under asymmetric 
strategies, we get (with 
€ 
A ≡ 24 + 86θ − 55θ 2 + 26θ 3 , as defined in the main text): 
 
qFS − qSF = 4− 57θ + 75θ
2 − 22θ 3
A
>
<
0⇔ 4− 57θ + 75θ 2 − 22θ 3 >
<
⇔θ
<
>
53
44 −
3
44 273 = 0.078 ;  
€ 
wFS − wSF =
θ 20 −103θ + 2θ 2( )
A
>
<
0⇔ 20 −103θ + 2θ 2 >
<
⇔θ
<
>
103
4 −
9
4 129 = 0.1949 ; 
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€ 
π FS −π SF =
32 − 480θ −1494θ 2 + 8111θ 3 − 8133θ 4 + 2304θ 5 − 340θ 6
2A2 < 0⇔ 0.0591< θ < 0.513. 
■ 
 
A3 Proof of Lemma 2 
 
By comparing πFF from [6] against πSF from [15] and πSS from [7] against πFS from [14], we get: 
 
€ 
π FF −π SF =
2816 −10112θ − 60944θ 2 + 528832θ 3 − 766172θ 4 + 570016θ 5
−562742θ 6 + 467191θ 7 − 213449θ 8 + 48968θ 9 − 4404θ10
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2(5 − 2θ)2(2 + θ)2A2 > 0,∀θ ∈ (0,1)  
 
 
€ 
π SS −π FS =
3 −288 −16512θ −12938θ
2 −154277θ 3 + 356699θ 4
−328592θ 5 +164516θ 6 − 52544θ 7 +10912θ 8
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
50(3− 2θ)2 > 0, for 0.018 < θ < 0.47 .
             ■ 
 
A4 Equilibrium bonuses, wages and output with asymmetric unions 
 
FF case: 
 
biFF =
(2− 4θiθ j +θi +10θ j )(7θiθ j −16θi − 4θ j + 4)
2 8(θiθ j )2 −13θi2θ j −13θiθ j2 − 4θi2 − 25θiθ j − 4θ j2 + 56(θi +θ j )+ 20⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
; 
 
wiFF =
3θi (4−θ j )(2− 4θiθ j +θi +10θ j )
2 8(θiθ j )2 −13θi2θ j −13θiθ j2 − 4θi2 − 25θiθ j − 4θ j2 + 56(θi +θ j )+ 20⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
; 
 
qiFF =
(4−θ j )(2− 4θiθ j +θi +10θ j )(1−θi )
8(θiθ j )2 −13θi2θ j −13θiθ j2 − 4θi2 − 25θiθ j − 4θ j2 + 56(θi +θ j )+ 20⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
. 
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SS case: 
 
biSS =
3(1−θi )(2θ j +3)
5(9− 4θiθ j )
;  wiSS =
2θ j +3θi
9− 4θiθ j
;  qiSS =
6(1−θi )(2θ j +3)
5(4θiθ j − 9)
. 
 
 
Asymmetric case: 
 
biFS =
(4−13θi )(2θiθ j −θi + 4θ j + 4)
2(26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24)
;  wiFS =
9θi (2θiθ j −θi + 4θ j + 4)
2(26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24)
; 
 
qiFS =
3(1−θi )(2θiθ j −θi + 4θ j + 4)
26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24
. 
 
 
 
bjSF =
(4−θi )(1−θ j )(8θi +1)
26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24
;  wjSF =
θ j (8+θi )(8θi +1)
26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24
; 
 
qjSF =
2(4−θi )(1−θ j )(8θi +1)
26θi2θ j − 21θi2 −34θiθ j + 78θi +8θ j + 24
. 
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